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Religious symbols are historically significant and socially powerful. They have many forms 
and functions. Their legal regulation presents difficult challenges for courts, particularly 
international courts. This article examines how the European Court of Human Rights has 
approached the regulation of the regulation of religious symbols by national jurisdictions. It 
submits that the fundamental touchstone of the Court’s jurisprudence lies in its approach to 
secularism. It has accepted secularism as consistent with the values underpinning the 
Convention. This is a strategic and sensible approach. There are limits imposed by the 
prohibitions on discrimination and indoctrination. Beyond secularism there have been 
tentative steps towards a balancing / reasonable accommodation approach but the Court 
appreciates that the balances are difficult ones on which reasonable people, and even 
reasonable states, may legitimately disagree. 
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Religious symbols are historically significant and socially powerful. They can take many 
forms, for example, dress, objects or structures. They can at once be both simple in form yet 
complex in meaning. They can expressly or implicitly communicate messages. The messages 
can be subtle or rather unsubtle. They can be intended to be, or perceived to be, inclusive and 
  
positive, or exclusive and negative. They can change the nature and charachter of a particular 
social, communal or public space. Religious symbols can signify status or identity or the lack 
thereof. They also serve the broader role of chronicling the evolving histories and traditions 
of religious communities and broader societies.  
 
2 The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Regulating the Regulation 
of Religious Symbols 
 
It is not the role of the European Court to regulate the use of religious symbols (including 
religious dress). Its role is to regulate their regulation by States parties. Regulating symbols 
that have such complex and contested meanings is challenging for any national legal system.1 
In some contexts, the insertion of what can only be described as a very strong “political 
dimension” into the legal regulation of such symbols has only added to the challenges. It is 
beyond question that the motivation for the legal regulation of symbols, even if framed to 
apply in a non-discriminatory manner,2 can be to reflect or further a particular political 
ideology. It can also be implicitly rejecting an alternative political or religious ideology.3 
Given its subsidiary role it was perhaps natural that the Court would be reluctant to find 
violations of the ECHR with respect to religious symbols except where it was convinced that 
that was the appropriate course.4  
Looking back over the period from Kokkinakis in 1998 through to 2017, the 
jurisprudence of the European Court on religious symbols in the widest sense has taken 
something of an evolutionary course.5 There have been some significant changes in the 
reasoning though this has not necessarily changed the outcome.6 However, particularly 
through a number of seminal Grand Chamber judgements, the faultlines in that jurisprudence 
have become clearer and sharper. The general approach of the Court is founded on (i) 
                                                 
1 See Peter Cumper and Tom Lewis, ‘Taking Religion Seriously? Human Rights and Hijab in Europe - Some 
Problems of Adjudication’, 24 Journal of Law and Religion (2009), p. 599.  
2 So as to avoid falling foul of Article 14 ECHR. See section 6 infra. 
3 Hilal Elver, The Headscarf Controversy: Secularism and Freedom of Religion (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012) described the Şahin judgment as a ‘political symbol of opposition to Islam in Europe’, p. 29. 
4 See Teresa Sanader, ‘Religious Symbols and Garments in Public Places – A Theory for the Understanding of 
S.A.S. v France’, 9 Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law (2015), p. 186. As of the end of 2016 
there had only been 65 violations of Article 9 ECHR. 
5 See Erica Howard, Law and the Wearing of Religious Symbols: European Bans on the Wearing of Religious 
Symbols in Education (Oxford: Routledge, 2012); Anastasia Vakulenko, Islamic Veiling in Legal Discourse 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), pp. 42-50.  
6 See Eweida and S.A.S. cases infra. 
  
accommodating the significant variety of Church-State relationships that exists among the 
now 47 States parties; (ii) the absence throughout Europe of a uniform conception of the 
significance of religion in society; (iii) the affirmation to the importance of protection of 
freedom of religion and belief in a pluralist democracy set out in Kokkinakis (which continues 
to be of critical importance in an era in which protection of religious believers seems to be in 
decline); (iv) the role of the State as the organiser (not the suppressor) of the religious and 
belief protection regime; and (v) the existence of both negative and positive obligations on 
States. In applying these elements to religious symbols the Court has had to address major 
systemic issues. These are considered in turn.  
 
 
3 Secularism and its Relationship(s) with Neutrality 
It is notable that the great majority of cases on religious clothing have concerned France, 
Turkey and Switzerland, all of which are, in constitutional terms, secular States.7 Secularism 
exists along a spectrum in most ECHR states parties.8 It is submitted that what was critical to 
the outcome in all of the cases on religious clothing was the European Court’s approach to 
secularism.9 Thus even if some of the Court’s comments that have attracted criticism, such as 
on gender equality or the power of symbols, were omitted, the results would have been the 
same. 
In Şahin v. Turkey10 the European Court held Turkey’s notion of secularism to be 
‘consistent with the values underpinning the Convention ... upholding that principle, which is 
undoubtedly one of the fundamental principles of the Turkish State which are in harmony 
with the rule of law and respect for human rights, may be considered necessary to protect the 
democratic system in Turkey.’11 The Court thereby essentially accepted Turkey’s argument 
that the only way it would be able to ensure compliance with the ECHR, given its 
predominantly Muslim population and fears of a political radicalisation of Islam, was to 
                                                 
7 See the comparative practice considered in Dominic McGoldrick, The Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe 
(Hart: Oxford, 2006). 
8 See Myriam Hunter-Henin, ‘Why the French Don’t Like the Burqa: Laïcité, National Identity and Religious 
Freedom’, 61 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2012), p. 1. 
9 See Ian Leigh and Rex Adhar, ‘Post-Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights’, 75 Modern Law 
Review (2012), p. 75.  
10 European Court of Human Rights [GC], Şahin v. Turkey, Application No. 44774/98, judgment of 10 
November 2005. 
11 Ibid., para. 114.  
  
operate as a secular State.12 Notwithstanding liberal concerns at the political significance of 
the military’s role in Turkey in upholding secularism, for a Court concerned with the 
practical existence and exercise of Convention rights, it would have been difficult to reject 
that argument outright.13 The same approach was applied to the prohibition for students of 
religiously-oriented public secondary schools to wear the Islamic head-scarf within the limits 
of the school in Köse and 93 Others v. Turkey14 and to the prohibition on a University 
Professor wearing a headscarf in Kurtulmuş v. Turkey.15 Kurtulmuş was significant because 
Kurtulmuş was an adult. France does not apply its prohibition on headscarves to adults in 
Universities.  
Many of the French cases including Dogru v. France, Kervanci v. France,16 and 
Aktas v. France,17 have also been based on the same kind of reasoning related to the secular 
system. All of the cases arose in an educational context. However, in Ebrahimian v. France18 
the Court applied the same approach to the whole of the public sector workspace (which 
covers more than 21% of all potential jobs).19 In its reasoning, the Court strongly relied on its 
previous case law on headscarf bans, in particular Şahin and Kurtulmuş, to apply beyond the 
educational environment. Again the dominant theme of the judgment was France’s secular 
system. Dahlab v. Switzerland20 was technically an admissibility decision but in substance it 
was a judgment on the merits. The European Court gave significant weight to the Federal 
Court’s view that the interference with the Dahlab’s freedom to manifest her religion was 
justified by the need, in a democratic society, to protect the right of State school pupils to be 
taught in a context of ‘denominational neutrality’.  
These cases have attracted great international attention, often critical. However, it is 
important to note that, inasmuch as acceptance of measures to defend secularism was 
                                                 
12 See Karime Bennoune, ‘Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis of Headscarves, Religious 
Expression, and Women’s Equality Under International Law’, 45 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
(2006-7), p. 367. 
13 Şahin, para. 122. 
14 European Court of Human Rights, Köse and 93 Others v. Turkey, Application No. 26625/02, decision on 
admissibility of 24 January 2006. 
15 European Court of Human Rights, Kurtulmuş v. Turkey, Application No. 65500/01, decision on admissibility 
of  24 January 2006.  
16 European Court of Human Rights, Kervanci v. France, Application Nos. 31645/04 and 27058/05, 4 
December 2008, paras. 68-72.  
17 European Court of Human Rights, Aktas v. France, Application No. 43563/08, decision on the admissibility 
of this and five other cases of 30 June 2009.  
18 European Court of Human Rights, Ebrahimian v. France, Application No. 64846/11, 26 November 2015 (by 
six votes to one).  
19 See Sabrina Garahan, ‘A Right to Discriminate? Widening the Scope for Interference with Religious Rights 
in Ebrahimian v France’, 5 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2016) 352.   
20 European Court of Human Rights, Dahlab v. Switzerland, Application No. 42393/98, 15 February 2001. 
  
fundamental to the outcome of those cases, then the vast majority of ECHR states parties 
would not be able to rely on that approach in the same way because they are distinctly less 
secular or not secular at all. For example, if the UK adopted the French prohibition the 
wearing of religious clothing it would be unlikely to withstand the European Court’s scrutiny.  
 
4 Religious Symbols: Manifestations and the Non-interference Doctrine  
 
In these two areas there has been a discernible evolution in jurisprudence dealing with 
religious symbols. By the time of Eweida and Others v. UK21 in 2013 (concerning the 
wearing of small Christian crosses) the Court made it clear that to determine whether there 
was a ‘manifestation of religion or belief’ the existence of a sufficiently close and direct 
nexus between the act and the underlying belief had to be determined on the facts of each 
case. In particular, there was no requirement on the applicant to establish that he or she acted 
in fulfilment of a duty mandated by the religion in question. Visibly wearing a cross in order 
to ‘bear witness’ to Christian faith met the test in the Eweida and Chaplin, as did objection to 
counselling same-sex partners in McFarlane and objection to participating in the creation of 
same-sex civil partnerships in Ladele.22 In S.A.S. v. France23 in 2014 the Court held that it 
could not be required of S.A.S. either to prove that she was a practising Muslim or to show 
that it was her faith which obliged her to wear the full-face veil.24 Her statements sufficed in 
this connection, since there was no doubt that this was, for certain Muslim women, a form of 
practical observance of their religion and could be seen as a ‘practice’ within the meaning of 
Article 9(1) ECHR.25 The fact that it was a minority practice had no effect on its legal 
characterisation. 
For a long period there was also clear and constant jurisprudence on a non-
interference doctrine. In Eweida that line of jurisprudence was effectively reversed. By 
shifting the analysis from the interference stage to the justification stage some individuals 
will succeed who would not have done so before because they establish that the balance was 
not fair. Eweida was one of them. It is interesting to compare the approach of the European 
Court in Eweida’s case to that of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice. 
                                                 
21 European Court of Human Rights, Eweida and Others v. UK, Application Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 
51671/10 and 36516/10, 15 January 2013, para. 82.  
22 Ibid., paras. 89, 97, 103 and 108. 
23 European Court of Human Rights, S.A.S. v. France, Application No. 43835/11, 1 July 2014.  
24 Ibid., para. 56. 
25 Ibid. 
  
Although some had hoped that the latter court would adopt a very progressive approach to 
protecting religious rights in the EU,26 in two cases decided on the same day it was rather 
more restrictive.  
Although the focus has been shifted to the justification stage, in many cases the 
balance may still fall against the individual. This was the case in relation to the three other 
applicants in the Eweida and Others case. For Chaplin, concerning a nurse who wished to 
wear a cross at work, the ‘health and safety issues’ in a hospital, a public authority, were ‘was 
inherently of a greater magnitude’ than the corporate image reasons in Eweida, and so 
weighed heavily and decisively in the balance.27 For Ladele, although the requirement to 
participating in the creation of civil partnerships was introduced by her employer after she 
began her employment, the local authority’s policy aimed to secure the rights of others which 
were also protected under the Convention, that is, not to be discriminated against on grounds 
of sexual orientation. The Court specifically stated that, ‘the most important factor to be taken 
into account is that the employer’s action was intended to secure the implementation of its 
policy of providing a service without discrimination’.28 The national authorities had not 
exceeded the wide margin of appreciation afforded to them when it came to striking a balance 
between competing Convention rights.29 Ladele’s was a difficult case because her job had 
changed factually and the public authority employer had been able to make what in other 
contexts would be termed a ‘reasonable accommodation’ for her.30 However, ultimately the 
European Court was not willing to undermine the growing strength of the prohibition on non-
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, an area in which the UK, the Council of 
Europe and the EU are very much on the forefront of developments.31 Modern equality 
legislation such as the UK’s Equality Act 2010 is often a very carefully crafted package deal 
that encompasses degrees of accommodation, for example, for religious organisations. The 
Court was not willing to take it upon itself to extend those exemptions to accommodate 
individuals.32 It is hard to disagree with that reticence.33 In terms of balancing McFarlane’s 
                                                 
26 See Eugenia Relaño Pastor, ‘Towards Substantive Equality for Religious Believers in the Workplace? Two 
Supranational European Courts, Two Different Approaches’, 5 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2016), p. 
255.  
27 Eweida and Others, para. 99. 
28 Ibid., para. 109. 
29 Ibid., para. 106. 
30 See Emanuelle Bribosia, Julie Ringelheim, & Isabelle Rorive, ‘Reasonable Accommodation for Religious 
Minorities’, 7 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2010), p. 147.  
31 See Dominic McGoldrick, ‘The Development and Status of Sexual Orientation Discrimination under 
International Human Rights Law’, Human Rights Law Review (2016), p. 613.  
32 See Carl Stychin, ‘Faith in the Future: Sexuality, Religion and the Public Sphere’, 29 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies (2009), p. 1.  
  
was undoubtedly the weakest case on the facts. However, as in Ladele, the most important 
factor to be taken into account was that the employer’s action was intended to secure the 
implementation of its policy of providing a service without discrimination.  
The shifting of the analysis in religious dress / symbols cases to the justification stage 
is undoubtedly a positive development in terms of the protection of Article 9, and has been 
widely welcomed. Some individuals will win when they would have lost. Some will lose but 
here will be a more reasoned and principled justification for them losing.34 There is a greater 
possibility for religious beliefs to be given more weight when placed against the pursuit of 
‘communal secular goods’.35 Looking forward, it also creates more room for the evolution of 
something resembling a doctrine of reasonable accommodation.36 When such doctrines have 
been developed then in some jurisdictions, a good example of which is Canada, their 
application has become stricter over time, thus giving stronger protection to the manifestation 
of religious rights. 
 
5 The Margin of Appreciation 
 
Another major systemic issue raised in the religious symbols cases has been the appropriate 
scope of, and the application of, the margin of appreciation (MoA).37 Almost every critic of 
the jurisprudence argues that the MoA afforded too states is too wide and the Court’s 
standard of review is too limited.38 The MoA dominates almost all of the major cases. Indeed, 
its influence is growing. Consensus is normally relied upon to expand the scope of rights and 
restrict the scope of limitations. However, legal and social experimentation is possible within 
limits. It is clear that it is open to states to impose new restrictions on rights and these may 
fall within the MoA even if other states have not imposed them. A striking illustration is the 
ban on the wearing in public places of clothing that is designed to conceal the face (the so-
                                                                                                                                                        
33 See Julie Maher, ‘Eweida and others: A New Era for Article 9?,’ 63 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly (2014), at pp. 231-232. 
34 Cf. Dominic McGoldrick, ‘Religion and Legal Spaces: in Gods we Trust; in the Church we Trust, but need to 
verify’, 12 Human Rights Law Review (2012), p. 759. 
35 Cf. Julian Rivers, ‘Promoting Religious Equality’, 1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2012), p.1. 
36 Cf. Ann Power-Forde, ‘Freedom of Religion and “Reasonable Accommodation” in the Case Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights’, 5 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2016) 575. 
37 See Dominic McGoldrick, ‘Religious Rights and the Margin of Appreciation’, in: P. Agha (ed.) Human Rights 
Between Law and Politics - The Margin of Appreciation in Post-National Contexts (Oxford: Hart, 2017), p. 145. 
See also the contribution to this special issue by Stephanie Berry.  
38 See the literature cited in Dominic McGoldrick, ‘A Defence of the Margin of Appreciation and an Argument 
for its Application by the Human Rights Committee’, 65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2016), 
p. 21. 
  
called Burqa-ban).39 Of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe, only France and 
Belgium had actually imposed such bans.40 Nonetheless, in S.A.S. v. France41 in 2014 the 
ECtHR considered that there was no European consensus as to whether or not there should be 
a blanket ban on the wearing of the full-face veil in public places.42 The ECtHR held that 
having regard in particular to the breadth of the MoA accorded to France, the ban could can 
be regarded as proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the preservation of the conditions of 
‘living together’ (vivre ensemble) as an element of the ‘protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others’.43 However, even when judges accept the concept of looking for consensus in 
determining the MoA, there have been cases in which there were significant and often very 
critical dissents on how it should be assessed.44  
A particular criticism relates to the framing or formulation of the issue or question 
relating to religious rights to which consensus does or does not attach. The answer can vary 
depending on the formulation. In Şahin v. Turkey the narrow factual issue was the regulation 
of religious clothing in a university. There was no uniform European conception of the 
significance of religion in society or the wearing of religious symbols in educational 
institutions but there was a virtual consensus on whether adult women in universities could 
wear religious clothing. Alongside Turkey only two other European states prohibited the 
wearing of religious clothing in Universities. The ECtHR chose the first formulation of the 
consensus issue. The different outcomes of the Chamber and the Grand Chamber in Lautsi v. 
Italy, concerning the display of crucifixes in classrooms, can also be explained by how the 
issue was framed.45  
There will usually be a wide MoA if the State is required to strike a balance between 
competing private and public interests or competing rights and interests that are protected 
under the ECHR. Many religious rights cases are of this type.46 Again much turns on how the 
ECtHR frames or conceptualises the issues. The more abstract the framing the wider the 
                                                 
39 See Alessandro Ferrari and Sabrina Pastorellivi (eds.), The Burqa Affair Across Europe (Farnham: Ashgate 
2013); Eva Brems (ed.), The Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in European and the Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
40 Since then Bulgaria has imposed a ban, as has a region of Switzerland. A ban has also been approved by the 
lower house of the Dutch Parliament. 
41 S.A.S. v. France, paras. 106-159.  
42 Ibid., para. 156. 
43 Ibid., para. 157.  
44 See the Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom in the S.A.S. case. 
45 European Court of Human Rights [GC], Lautsi v. Italy, Application No. 30814/06, 18 March 2011. See Guilio 
Itzcovich, ‘One, None and One Hundred Thousand Margins of Appreciations: The Lautsi Case’, 13 Human 
Rights Law Review (2013) 287.  
46 See Saila Ouald Chaib, ‘Procedural Fairness as a Vehicle for Inclusion in the Freedom of Religion 
Jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court’, 16 Human Rights Law Review (2016), p. 511. 
  
MoA and vice versa. In Eweida and Others v. UK,47 the ECtHR only found a violation in one 
of the cases, Eweida, in which it framed the issue as a balance between an individual’s right 
to manifest their religion and the employer’s wish to project a certain corporate image.48 This 
framing made it more likely that the ECHR right would weight more heavily in the balance 
and result in a violation, and so it did. In the other cases it found no violation where the 
balancing interest was the protection of the health and safety of nurses and patients 
(Chaplin),49 providing a public service which was effective in terms of practicality and 
efficiency and which complied with the overarching policy of not discriminating on grounds 
of sexual orientation (Ladele),50 and action by a private employer which was intended to 
secure the implementation of its policy of providing a service without discrimination 
(McFarlane).51 The framings in the latter three cases made the likelihood of a finding of non-
violation much greater, and indeed that was the result in each case.  
In has been argued that in some cases the ECtHR has too readily accepted the 
interests being balanced against religious rights.52 Such an approach places great weight on 
the individuals’ rights against those of the wider community represented by the State. 
However, that is too individualistic an approach and would fail in the vast majority of cases. 
The State’s argument is that the threat to secularism comes not from the single individual but 
from the combined effect of all the religious individuals concerned. There does not need to be 
evidence that any particular individual is a victim of patriarchy, oppression or gender 
inequality or that their choice or agency has been restricted.53  
 
6 Discrimination on the Basis of Religion 
 
Although the European Court has afforded States, whether at the secular or religious end of 
the spectrum, a wide MoA to regulate religious symbols and dress, the prohibition on 
discrimination in Article 14 can be seen as something of significant backstop or limit. In 
many of the leading cases – Şahin, Dogru, Aktas, Eweida and Others, and S.A.S., Article 14 
                                                 
47Eweida and Others, para. 109.  
48 Ibid., paras. 94-95. 
49 Ibid., paras. 98-100. 
50 Ibid., paras. 102-106. 
51 Ibid., 107-110. 
52 See Stephanie Berry, ‘A “Good Faith” Interpretation of the Right to Manifest Religion? The Diverging 
Approaches of the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee’, 37 Legal Studies 
(2017, forthcoming). 
53 See Cécile Laborde, ‘Female Autonomy, Education and the Hijab’, 9 Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy (2006), p. 365.  
  
challenges were raised but failed. States are generally sensible enough not to facially 
discriminate in their laws even if the political context makes it clear that the intended target 
of the legislation was a the dress of a particular religion (for example the so-called burqa 
ban).54  
 Regulation of the building of religious premises is likely to be another area where 
Article 14 may provide a more fruitful ground of challenge. In Ouardiri v. Switzerland55 and 
Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse and Others v. Switzerland,56 all of the applicants submitted, 
inter alia, that a prohibition on building minarets amounted to a violation of religious freedom 
and to discrimination on the ground of religion. In two virtually identical decisions, the 
Court, by an unstated majority, declared their applications inadmissible on the ground that 
they could not claim to be the ‘victims’ of a violation of the Convention. The Court took a 
fairly strict approach to what is required to practice the Islamic religion. However, the ban is 
facially discriminatory (the building of minarets is prohibited).57 It must be doubtful that the 
European Court would be willing to consider that the prohibition was reasonable and 
objectively justified, notwithstanding that it was the result of a popular referendum.58  
 
7 Religious Symbolism in the Public Place and the Private Space 
 
Increasingly important, but difficult issues are identifying where, in spatial terms, the public 
square or public place are? In modern societies the degree of regulation means that it seems 
to be ever widening and leaving less space for private individuals and private institutions (e.g. 
private hospital, private school, non-state employers). In a sense the modern and post-modern 
State is everywhere. Most religious dress / symbols cases have concerned education and the 
workplace. An area with a number of pending cases is the wearing of religious clothing in a 
courtroom.59  
                                                 
54 See S.A.S.. 
55 European Court of Human Rights, Ouardiri v. Switzerland, Application No. 65840/09, 8 July 2011. 
56 European Court of Human Rights, Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse and Others v. Switzerland. Application 
No. 66274/09, 8 July 2011. 
57 The official German text states that ‘Der Bau von Minaretten ist verboten.’ 
58 See Lorenz Langer, ‘Panacea or Pathetic Fallacy? The Swiss Ban on Minarets’, 43 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law (2010), p. 863. 
59 See Lachiri v. Belgium, Application No. 3413/09; and Hamidović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Application 
No. 57792/15.  
  
In terms of the wider public space, State regulation is growing. In Ahmet Arslan and 
Others v. Turkey60 127 members of a religious group known as Aczimendi tarikatÿ, 
complained of their conviction in 1997 for a breach of the law on the wearing of headgear 
and of the rules on wearing religious garments in public. The European Court found a 
violation of Article 9. The Court emphasised that in contrast to other cases, the case 
concerned punishment for the wearing of particular dress in public areas that were open to all, 
and not regulation of the wearing of religious symbols in public establishments, where 
religious neutrality might take precedence over the right to manifest one’s religion.  
The applicant in S.A.S. v. France, challenging the legislative ban on full-face veiling 
in all public places, relied heavily on the Court’s approach in Ahmet Arslan. However, the 
Court distinguished the cases: 
 
while both cases concern a ban on wearing clothing with a religious connotation in 
public places, the present case differs significantly from Ahmet Arslan and Others in 
the fact that the full-face Islamic veil has the particularity of entirely concealing the 
face, with the possible exception of the eyes.61 
 
France submitted a number of justifications for the prohibition. Very significantly, the Court 
rejected its justifications based on gender equality.62 A State Party could not invoke gender 
equality in order to ban a practice that was defended by women, such as S.A.S., in the context 
of the exercise of the rights in Articles 8 and 9 ECHR, unless it were to be understood that 
individuals could be protected on that basis from the exercise of their own fundamental rights 
and freedoms.63 The Court thereby effectively responded to the criticisms of Judge Tulkens in 
Şahin and possibly gave some weight to the limited empirical evidence of third party 
intervenors64 on gender equality. It is notable that in S.A.S. the Court did not repeat some of 
the comments on Muslim women and gender relations in Şahin and Dahlab that had been 
criticised as based on stereotypes.65 It also seemed to more clearly appreciate and understand 
the practical significance of the ban for religiously observant women, the traumatising effect 
                                                 
60 European Court of Human Rights, Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 41135/98, 23 
February 2010. 
61 S.A.S. v. France, para. 136. 
62 Ibid., paras. 118-119.  
63 Ibid., para. 119. 
64 See S.A.S. v. France, paras. 89-105. 
65 See Lourdes Peroni, ‘Religion and Culture in the Discourse of the European Court of Human Rights: The 
Risks of Stereotyping and Naturalising’, 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2014), p.195. 
  
of facing a prosecution and that certain Islamophobic remarks had marked the debate.66 The 
Court also rejected justifications based on respect for human dignity. The clothing in 
question, although perceived as strange by many of those who observed it, was the expression 
of a cultural identity which contributed to the pluralism that was inherent in democracy.67 
Finally, it rejected a justification based on public safety.68 However, the Court accepted a 
justification offered for limiting rights that was based on ensuring the observance of the 
minimum requirements of life in society as part of the ‘protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others’. It found that the ban could be regarded as justified in its principle solely in so far 
as it sought to guarantee the conditions of ‘living together’,69 and, having regard in particular 
to the breadth of the margin of appreciation afforded to France, the ban could be regarded as 
proportionate to the aim pursued. There was a very strong majority for this aspect of the 
decision (15-2). Although the decision attracted widespread interest, much of it focussed on 
the meaning and risks associated with the seemingly novel basis for restrictions, namely 
‘living together’70 it accords with the intuitive view of many people in Europe that the full 
face veil goes too far. Islamophobic sentiments may underlie that view but so too may 
genuine concerns about the segregation, isolation and marginalization of Muslim women. 
The Court was effectively drawing a line in the European sand. The notion of ‘living 
together’ appears rather flexible but the Court openly acknowledged the ‘resulting risk of 
abuse’.71 It is actually difficult to think of other examples of restrictions that could credibly 
be based on the same approach. However, it is submitted that it is very significant that S.A.S. 
was based on the general protection of the ‘rights and freedoms of others’ rather than on 
France’s secular system. Subject to their own constitutional restraints, it would open to other 
member States of the Council of Europe to follow France’s example, irrespective of the 
degree to which they are secular. Applications are pending from Belgium concerning full face 
veiling.72 In June 2017 it was reported that Norway was proposing to ban full-face veil in 
                                                 
66 S.A.S. v. France, paras. 139-52.  
67 See S.A.S. v. France, para. 120. 
68 Ibid., para. 139. 
69 See also Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, Resolution 2076 ‘Freedom of Religion and Living 
Together in Democratic Society’, 30 September 2015. 
70 See Ilias Trispiotis, ‘Two Interpretations of “Living Together” in European Human Rights Law’, 75 
Cambridge Law Journal (2016), p. 580. 
71 See S.A.S. v. France, para. 122. The dissenting judges called it a ‘very general concept’ and criticised it as 
‘far-fetched and vague’ (para. 5). 
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nurseries, schools and universities.73 For this reason the S.A.S. judgment was arguably of 
much wider import and significance than the headscarf cases.  
 
 
8 Concluding Reflections 
 
It has been submitted that the fundamental touchstone of the Court’s jurisprudence has been 
its approach to secularism. It has accepted secularism as consistent with the values 
underpinning the Convention. It is always possible to critique the variable operation of 
secularism in any particular State. It will always be uneven, imperfect and evolving. That is 
the very nature of constitutional evolution. The European Court has had to navigate a difficult 
path in addressing religious symbols and dress. Being acutely aware of this it has adopted a 
strategic and sensible approach. There are limits imposed by the prohibitions on 
discrimination and indoctrination but what is ‘necessary’ in a ‘democratic society’ is not, or 
at least not wholly, an objective concept. The national context and traditions have to be 
appreciated and understood. Beyond the hard cases involving strongly secular states there 
have been tentative steps towards a balancing of rights and interests and something 
resembling a reasonable accommodation approach. Yet the Court appreciates that such 
balances and accommodations are difficult ones on which reasonable people, and even 
reasonable States, may legitimately disagree. It knows that it does not necessarily know any 
better than they do. 
                                                 
73 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40251760. 
